Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The core hypothesis presented by this article relies on the argument that there has not been sufficient and plausible evidence to support an effort regarding the Government\u2019s Administrations in detecting, condemning, and preventing money laundering specifically drug trafficking organizations within the Mexican territory. This leaves room for interpretation in how much is the state directly involved within such activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, one can begin to classify Mexico as being an example of a \u2018state captured Democracy\u2019. This article offers a thorough analysis of the works of numerous security specialists, such as Helleman et al, Sonia Alda, Juan Antonio Le Clercq, and Garay Salamanca et al., to name just some. We will focus on their efforts in understanding the characteristics that contribute to the definition of a weak state, and how this may result in a state captured Democracy. These elements being, the concept and the uniform application of the rule of law in a state, the concept of impunity, corruption, political violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For this particular article, the object studied is criminal organizations, specifically drug trafficking criminal organizations within the Mexican territory from a historic approach, therefore analysing if they have been able to work as captors of the Mexican state, and ultimately the levels of implantation these may have within the state apparatus. And if so, which levels have they been able to reach so far, and by which means. A final section of this article will attempt to provide suggestions, recommendations, or actions towards how to effectively tackle the issue at hand. One of them, being effective money laundering detection efforts. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The term has been overly popular after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, because of the \u2018necessity of the reorientation and reduction of the state\u2019s role in the economy (Hellman et al. 2003: 752). According to Hellman when this phenomenon occurred in weak states or underdeveloped civil societies there was a latent fear of the \u2018leviathan state being replaced by a new fear towards oligarchs who manipulate politicians and shape institutions to advance and protect their own empires at the expense of social interest\u2019 (Hellman et al. 2003: 752).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, as stated by the definition provided by Helleman et al the concept of \u2018State capture\u2019 consists in a state that has no self- determination\/governance and control rather than someone else has influence over the state\u2019s decisions. Hellman et al\u2019s investigation used the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) to compare and contrast information to understand how the oligarchs and the state behaved regarding corruption and state capture (Hellman et al. 2000).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Their works present a recognition that powerful firms have indeed been able to capture the state and collude with public officials to extract rents through the manipulation of the state power. What we highlight regarding one of the many virtues of the BEEPS is its capacity to \u00b4provide a microeconomic perspective by the separation in the costs and benefits to firms associated with different forms of influence and corruption\u2019 (Hellman et al. 2003: 755).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, and with the purpose of improving the quality of the data provided by the BEEPS the objective and nature of the project were explained to the interviewed subjects, the data was recorded anonymously without identifying names of respondents from the interviewed companies and they were collected not by the government but by international organizations. The data collected by the BEEP includes over 20 former USSR countries and in each country, the sample collected was of over 150 firms each. There were 3 different categories within the classification of the firm\u2019s sector, manufacturing, mining and services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The impunity complex<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This section will attempt to unwind the concept of impunity. Impunity can be defined as: \u2018crime without punishment, the absence or inexistence of sanctions nor legal reprisals when committing a crime\u2019 (Le Clercq, 2019: 21). In the paper presented Le Clercq discusses impunity and unbundled into different concepts, \u2018thick impunity\u2019 and \u2018thin impunity\u2019 depending on the degree the impunity implicates. \u2018thin impunity\u2019, as Le Clercq further discusses, functions within the relationship between people and the law, particularly in the realm of criminal law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He introduces the concept of \u2018thin impunity\u2019 as a concept that is directly related with punitive justice which means that it will focus on the punishment, or the number of sentencing or rulings presented in relation to the crimes committed (Le Clercq, 2019: 21).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then when presenting the concept \u2018thick impunity\u2019 the analysis widens and Le Clercq defines the concept by introducing the definition provided by the report from the United Nations Human Rights Council 2005 by Diane Orentlicher. Thick impunity \u2018means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Le Clercq emphasizes how the \u2018tick impunity\u2019 conceptualization includes the relationship not only between the people and the law but rather a holistic approach which includes, the violation of human rights, institutional malfunctioning this refers not only to structural but also to the functional aspects of institutions, to name some in relation to the implications of impunity (Le Clercq, 2019)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Equally important, he mentions how the implications of thick impunity have social, economic, and also physiological effects in the victims. To review, the \u2018thick impunity\u2019 concept as explained by Le Clercq is not a narrow concept. Rather a \u2018bi-dimensional one, that focuses the core issues in two correlated aspects: institutional structure and the socio-political conditions that determine and might explain its routine repetition (Le Clercq, 2019: 22).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Le Clercq mentions impunity as a behaviour a person can learn and even socialize. He comes to this conclusion by citing and analysing Frederich (1968). Frederich identifies certain traits and refers to them as \u2018political pathologies. In his works he discusses how the normalization of this impunity within the political and social spheres hinder the possibility of a total eradication of impunity in the state\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another idea presented in this article is the \u2018levels of implantation\u2019 impunity might have within society and the state:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, within the levels of implantation according to the parameters presented before \u2018state capture or the kidnapping of public institutions by groups or individuals to satisfy their personal necessities can be understood as: the level of implantation that exacerbates the first two. It has nothing to do with corruption and conflicts of interest as unbundled matters. It is meant to be understood as the systematic distortion of the public function or civil service\u2019 (Le Clercq, 2019: 32). Complementary to this, we can further expand on specific causes of the state capture implantation level Le Clercq mentions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Firstly, \u2018authorities that reform state law or define social programmes to protect or incentivize their personal interests\u2019 (Le Clercq, 2019). Secondly, \u2018Criminal organizations that through the means of corruption. Collusion or threat of the use of violence as a cohesive method penetrate institutions and impose that institutions and authorities work for them\u2019 (Le Clercq, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thirdly, impunity agreements or pacts between political organizations and political parties that agree to use their positions of authority and public funding for a purpose that serves their own instead of the public interest. This is a measure to prevent or halt the processes of institutional change requires that might affect their own interests negatively. Additionally, as a measure to prevent an effective prosecution to the corruption or participation of political actors in illicit actions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2006; Le Clercq, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, the extreme form of implantation of state capture consists in the existence of organized crime within the state apparatus (Chamblis, 1989; Fredrichs, 2009-2010; Karstendt, 2014; Le Clercq, 2019; Michalowski, 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n We would like to mention that there is another opinion, which is that the case of Mexico would not necessarily fall into the criteria of state capture rather than a criterion of Criminalized state, as Douglas Farah (2012) suggests in his paper \u201cEl Crimen Transnacional, terrorismo y Estados Criminalizados de Am\u00e9rica Latina <\/em>(2011)\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then again, as an attempt on revisioning Le Clercq the author might want to acknowledge that indeed, \u2018thick impunity\u2019 could be the appropriate approach to understanding the wider concept and implications of the concept. Because indeed the social-political, economic and human rights factors are of vital importance into understanding the consequences of how impunity might then be one of the causes or reasons for corruption and the implantation of criminal organizations within a certain territory in the case of this specific article, Latin- America. Other parts of this article will attempt to explore what other causes might add to a \u2018state capture democracy\u2019 by localizing other aspects such as: violence, rule of law, weak state that in combination with impunity can make sense into understanding the phenomena of state capture within a country like Mexico.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The concept of the weak state will be introduced throughout this document, according to the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World by Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick from Brookings Global Economy and Development 2008.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We measure state weakness to each state\u2019s effectiveness in delivering these four critical dimensions: fostering an environment conductive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population. (Rice & Patrick, 2008: 3)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second and third dimensions: establishing and maintaining, legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions, and securing their territory. Are the two dimensions that will guide a fraction of this analysis as dimensions that will be analysed and connected as dimensions that may serve also to understand the concept of state capture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The capture and co-opted reconfiguration of the state<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Introducing the works of Garay Salamanca et al. (2008) the authors would like to present a second study from within the Latin- American region to provide a more localized context concerning defining and understanding the state capture concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In their paper, Garay Salamanca et al., discuss state capture as, \u2018the form of full-scale corruption that weakens the economic structure of the state because of the disruption it provokes to the development of the laws, norms, decrees, rules and regulations\u2019 (Garay et al. 2008: 15).<\/p>\n\n\n\n They also signal how the term state capture is often reserved for former communist states who are transitioning to democratic ones. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that it is not purely exclusive for these states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Garay Salamanca et al. (2008) also highlights in their study how \u2018most of the thoric and empiric studies regarding this matter a difference is made between \u2018state capture\u2019 and \u2018administrative corruption\u2019 to refer to the exact moment in which \u2018corruption\u2019 is committed. Moreover, \u2018Administrative corruption an activity that is performed the allocated distortion of the early stages of normative and regulatory development of the state whereas state capture occurs within the execution and implementation of the laws and the rule of law\u2019 (Garay et al. 2008: 16). They remark on how state capture happens within the enforcement of the rule of law. Therefore, it can be understood that a state with administrative corruption does not necessarily mean a state capture, but not vice-versa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rule of law as a factor for implantation of organized crime<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In her paper, Alda discusses specifically the degree of impunity regarding criminal organizations in Latin America. This paper is not particularly focused on finding the causes for corruption rather the reasons why Criminal Organizations have the ability of functioning with such flexibility and impunity within the specific territories. The core of the discussion then being, the state\u2019s apparent inability to inflict control over organized criminal organizations. Alda\u2019s principal hypothesis revolves over the argument that, \u2018the complicity and protection that state authorities provide for those same criminal organizations they allegedly seek to control\u2019 (Alda, 2015: 64). In her study she also mentions that Latin-American states might be accurately classified as \u2018weak states\u2019 because of the lack of governance within their own structure and government, among other reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another important observation Alda postulates within her study is of \u2018how weak states have sufficient entity and state capacity to withhold a security and justice system, alas not to prevent that this overall system remains protected from becoming an accomplice of criminal organizations\u2019 (Alda, 2015: 65).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another chapter of paramount importance regarding Alda\u2019s argument is the rule of law or legal certainty a country is able or not to provide to all its citizens. The argument revolves around the understanding that \u2018one of the principal causes of insecurity is not the criminal actors per se, rather than the incapacity of the state to provide a rule of law over them\u2019 (Alda, 2015: 68). Moreover, even though she agrees that a consensus over the definition of a \u2018weak state\u2019 has yet to be understood. It is one of its intrinsic characteristics: the incapacity of the state to provide a homogeneous rule of law towards all its citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the rule of law states by definition that no one is above the law. Consequently, all members of government and their representatives must abide by it, and that they should be able to prosecute with the full extent of the law anyone who decides to infringe it within all its territory with no exception whatsoever. Then, whenever someone within the territory of the state decides either not to abide by that rule of law or not to enforce the rule of law equally for everyone. It allows legal uncertainty or impunity to present itself and as a consequence, corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This might constitute an ideal scenario for organized crime organizations to be able to establish themselves within the legal uncertainty the weak states present, and therefore begin to settle not only in the territory but to operate fully by understanding they might or might not be accountable to the consequences of the rule of law over criminal actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Criminal organizations, in the end, similar to capitalist firms or companies have comparable goals to fulfil, the most possible enrichment they are allowed to have in the shortest amount of time and resources, capitalization. They are also and are a conglomerate of three or more associates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, \u2018criminal organizations provide mostly goods (illicit) and services from very different natures. Drug Trafficking, being the most important and profitable of them all (Alda, 2015: 10) It would be of the highest importance when defining criminal organizations, to highlight the use of violence as one of their means to support their criminal activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding this last explanation, therefore it would be interesting to consider the similar pattern of behaviour within the argument Hellman et al discussed, in the end both the firms mentioned within the BEEPS and the criminal organizations provide goods and services. Both of them obey what Adam Smith first proposed in the Wealth of Nations. They are seeking to maximise their investment and resources and profit as much as they can from them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Criminal organizations, then to maximise their investments might find a proliferate environment weak states might provide, such as a weak rule of law, unaccountability regarding financial institutions and transparency as a beneficial environment to establish and flourish.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As Alda discusses, corruption and the presence of organized crime in fact, should not be observed as isolated phenomena, on the contrary there is actually a correlation among them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another important issue tackled by this article, stresses the importance of a democratic state, transparency within its institutions and a thorough implementation of the rule of law within the state as indicators and elements that lower the implantation rate of criminal organizations within a state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, again another consequence discussed by Alda\u2019s article consists in how an unequal application of the rule of law serves as an incentive for citizens, criminal organizations, and even members of government to act above the law and understand they might not be subject to its repercussions. An example of this might be that these citizens through the path of corruption have the means to \u2018buy\u2019 impunity to commit crimes within a certain territory the authorities \u2018granted\u2019. Another important element cited in Alda\u2019s paper is \u2018the possibility of the negotiation of the rule of law for some (Alda, 2015:75). This can be repeatedly observed within Latin America\u2019 (Alda, 2015; Gordillo, 1982; M\u00e9ndez, O\u2019Donnell y Pinheiro, 2002; Ni\u00f1o, 2005; P\u00e1sara, 2014; Walkmann, 2006).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Subsequently the authors would like to revision Alda now integrating Le Clercq and Hellman\u2019s et al in an attempt of integrating their important elements to recognise the state capture democracy paradigm in Latin-America. Reintroducing the concept of \u2018thick impunity\u2019, by Le Clercq. The author would like to connect this concept with the idea Alda conceptualizes in her works, the weak state and the characteristic of a lack of governance and a thorough application of \u2018the rule of law\u2019 which is mentioned in Le Clercq\u2019s works \u2018to understand impunity in Mexico it involves two interconnected aspects: a dysfunctional judicial system and the existence of people are above the law\u2019 (Le Clercq, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Both Le Clercq and Alda mention several elements that might be accurate to identify as \u2018symptoms\u2019 of a captured state problematic: \u2018thick impunity\u2019 which includes the characteristic of impunity as part of a weak state. This can be also understood as the inefficiency of the state to establish and equally enforce the \u2018rule of law\u2019 to everyone within the territory. Therefore, government officials, criminal organizations, or citizens would understand that there is a possibility for them to act above the law. The latter is also referring to Le Clercq\u2019s levels of implantation and State capture understanding and explanation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would be of the highest importance then to examine the case of Mexico through these visions to then identify the problem. Paying special attention to the detection of \u2018thick impunity\u2019 \u2018weak state\u2019 \u2018criminal organization implantation\u2019 \u2018violence\u2019 and the homogenous enforcement \u2018the rule of law\u2019 to then maybe understand if indeed the case of Mexico could be a case of state capture and then to evaluate which efforts have already been executed to tackle the criminality issues, drug trafficking specifically. With the purpose of suggesting alternative or additional courses of action that could provide a plausible solution to the issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Index for Global Impunity 2020, Le Clercq & Rodr\u00edguez et al.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Another relevant for this theoretical and historic review would be the study of the Global impunity Index 2020. This index combines quantitative and qualitative methods to provide an overview of impunity worldwide, and its relationship with other phenomena, inequality, corruption, and violence to name some. The authors would like to introduce some of the suggestions recommended in this study because of their relevance and direct relations towards effectively tackling corruption and impunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding the specific topic of impunity this index suggests as follows: impunity persists even when there are national and local official institutions responsible of safeguarding access to justice for all citizens. Likewise, as shown in the GII results, systematic and historic impunity exists in countries with the capacity to reform detrimental legal structures that in many cases were inherited from the past (Le Clercq & Rodr\u00edguez, 2020). This analysis also highlights how impunity is most likely present in countries with high levels of socio-economic inequalities. Such as, it happens within the Mexican case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The following are some of the several recommendations presented by the authors in the Index:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even though these recommendations were made for countries worldwide they are very relevant for the analysis for the Mexican case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Macro-criminality in Mexico<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Macro-criminality is a concept that can be understood as, \u2018a network that has certain characteristics, to commit certain delinquent acts: disappearing, extortion, homicide, human trafficking, drug trafficking. To perform these activities in a widespread territorial area and to be set up by the elements of 3 different structures, the political, the criminal and the corporate\u2019 (V\u00e1zquez, 2019). The author explores Macro- criminality using the case of Mexico as an example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is necessary to highlight the importance of the first structure mentioned, the state, when discussing Macro-criminality. It is because of this that \u2018there is an explicit demand of impunity coming from members of the criminal networks\u2019 (V\u00e1zquez, 2019). V\u00e1zquez argues that this is an example of how state capture might be exemplified within the networks of macro criminality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Annex 1. Macro Criminality Network: Lobbying vs. State Capture<\/p>\n\n\n\n V\u00e1zquez, mentions that in order to disrupt the human rights violations consequence of the macro criminal structures it is of vital importance to halt impunity, and create institutions within Mexico that have this particular task.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Evolution of anti money laundering actions in Mexico<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n To prevent and to effectively implement money laundering activities, The Mexican Government has implemented the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera<\/em> (UIF) an institution that was created back in 2004.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Account blocking has been an action taken by this unit. The importance of the UIF relies on tackling the Impunity Pact that might exist between all the elements involved: the treasury department, supreme court ministers, magistrate courts, governors, union leaders, public notaries, among others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The UIF could qualify as the biggest money laundering asset the current Mexican administration possesses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Table 1 shows an increase of the procedures of account blocking starting on 2015. An exponential growth is noticeable between 2018 and 2019. In 2018, only 800 accounts were blocked. In 2019 this number increased up to 12,085. The variable BPL (Blocked Persons List) respectively changes from 237 to 3,260.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Table 1. Statistics from Monetary Blocking<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The \u2018State capture\u2019 concept<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/seguridadinternacional.es\/resi\/html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Anexo-1.jpg\")
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